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Battle of Antietam
Never before or since in American History was so
much blood shed on a single day as on September 17, 1862,
at the battle of Antietam.

For the clarification of the

reader, the battle of Antiteam bears a double name--the
troops of the North referred to the battle as Antietam
while their counterparts referred to the engagement as
Sharpsburg.

Regardless as to its name, this historic

battle was the turning point of the Civil War and the
high tide of the Confederacy.

11he purpose of this paper

is to tell the story of General Lee's march into Maryland
which culminated in the battle of Antietam.

It is not

within the scope of this paper to give a detailed account
of every military engagement but rather an overall picture
of the Maryland campaign.
Following the battle of Second Bull Run on August
29th and 30th (in which John Pope was badly defeated),
General George McClellan was placed in command of the
defense of Washington. 1

At the time of McC~ellan 1 s

appointment, President Lincoln and General Halleck
regarded Washington as lost, but General Halleck boosted
the men's morale and Washington was made safe from attack. 2
General Lee did not attack Washington but instead
crossed the Potomac into Maryland.

Lee had many reasons

lRobert Johnson, Battles and Leaders of the Civil
War, New York: Devine Press, 1888, P• 549.

-

2~., pp.

551-552.

2

for crossing into Maryland, the major one being the hope
that a successful invasion would lead to recognition of
the Confederacy by the British.

Once the South was

recognized, overt aid might be obtained from England and
.France.

'l'he second reason for

~rossing

the Potomac was

to relieve the war-torn state of Virginia from the ravages
of contending armies.

It was felt that the losses of men

and material might be replenished from the North.

A final

reason for sending the Army of Northern Virginia northward
was to capitalize on recent Southern victories and to
woo the important border state of Maryland into joining
the Confederacy.3
Despite the many sound arguments for taking the
war to the North, General Lee showed concern for the
Maryland campaign in the following letter to President
Davis:
The army is not properly supplied
for an invasion of an enemy territory.
It lacks much of the material of war, is
feeble in transportation, the animals
being much reduced, and the men are
poorly provided with clothes, and in
thousa~ds of instances are destitute of
shoes.4
There were many reasons to worry about the success
of the Maryland campaign, but straggling was the biggest
concern.

Straggling was caused by wornout shoes and

improper diet.

The men's feet were not calloused and,

since General Lee did not permit plundering, the army
3L. VanLOanNaisawald, "Why Confederates Crossed
Potomac," Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. I, No. 5
(August, 19b2), PP• 20-21.
4rbid., p. 21.

3
lived on green corn and fruit.

Many of the men had bad

cases of diarrhea which weakened them physically and caused
much absence without leave from the ranks.

The march into

Maryland is often referred to as the "green corn campaign."5
A young recruit from Georgia, when questioned about his
absence from the ranks during the battle of Antietam
explained:
I had no shoes, I tried it barefoot,
but somehow my feet wouldn't callous. They
just kept bleeding. I found it hard to
keep up though I had the heart of a patroit
I began to feel that I didnft have patriotic
feet. Of course, I could have crawled on my
hands and knees, but then my hands would 6
have got so sore I couldn't fire my rifle.
Despite the discomfort of his men Lee crossed the
Potomac and entered Maryland.
federal

communication~

His objective was to destroy

wlth the West and then turn his

attention to Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington.7
Lee's Army crossed the Potomac on September 4th.
Curiosity seekers were disheartened when they failed to
get a glimpse of

Le~

and Jackson.

Both men had been

injured in separate riding accidents and were forced to
enter Maryland in ambulances.

On September 6th, the

Confederate army pitched camp near Fredrick.

Many

visitors came out to the camp to greet the Confederates,
5nouglass Southall Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, Vol.,II;
New York: Charles L. Webster Co., 1943, pp. l4b-52.
6B. A. Botkin, A Ci v1,l War 'lreasury of 'I'ales, Legends,
and Folxlore, New ~Qr~: Random House, 19bO, p. 112.

7Johnson, II, p. 605.
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with Longstreet and Stuart serving as the official greeters.
Longstreet was suffering with a badly rubbed heel, but it
was said that Stuart (being at his usual self) was ready
to see and talk with every good looking woman in sight.a
If failing to get a glimpse of the Confederate
generals was disheartening then it is doubtful if the
author can express in words the disappointment the
MaPylanders must have felt when they saw the typical
Confederate soldier.

Here is a description of "Johnny

Reb" in Maryland.
None had any under-clothing. My costume
consisted of a ragged pair of trousers,
a stained dirty jacket, and old slouch
hat, the brim pinned up with a thorn;
a begrimed blanket over my shoulder,
a grease smeared cotton haversack
full of apples and corn, a cartridge
box full and a musket. I was barefooted
and had a stone bruise on each foot • • •
There was no one there who would not
have been "run in" by the police had he
appea~ed on the street of any populous
city.'7
As the Confederate,army moved northward, McClellan

and Secretary Seward saw the need for the evacuation of
Harper's Ferry.

This Federal garrison would be in direct

line of Lee's invasion of Maryland and would probably
be captured.

In trying to convince General Halleck of

the need for the evacuation, Seward and McClellan called
8Freeman, II, PP•

153-54.

9sruce Catton, Terrible Swift Sword, Garden City,
New York: Doubleday Inc., 19S;, pp. 449-50.
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on the general one evening but were unable to persuade
him. 10
Without proper orders, McClellan started northward
in pursuit of Lee's army.

He had, to use his own words,

started the campaign with a noose around his neck.11
McClellan, acting with his usual slowness, moved his
force, interposing it between Washington and Lee, in three
movements northward {see Map I, p. 33).

The advance

from Washington was covered by the cavalry led by
General Pleasanton, who was soon in constant contact,
with the enemy's cavalry.

McC1ellan hoped first, to

gain accurate information as to Lee's movements, and
second, to push the work of supply and reorganization
as rapidly as possible.
Maryland received Lee's army rather decently but
the Army could not regard itself as welcome.

One exception

to the rule was the warm reception General J. E. B. Stuart
received at Urbana, Maryland.

In return for the hospitality

he had received, he gave a ball with the army band
furnishing the music.

This charming occasion came to a

sudden halt when McClellan's advance guard struck the
outpost.

Following a sharp skirmish, the Confederates

hastened back "covered with glory" and the dancing was
resumed.

The final interruption of the dancing came

550-54.
550-54.

lOJohnson, II, pp.
llibid., pp.
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when the wounded were brought in.

After startled shrieks,

the women started dressing the men's wounds.

One wounded

fellow remarked that he would get hit any day to have
such a pretty surgeon dress his wounds.

The dance over,

the soldiers escorted their "lovely angels" home by the
light of the moon and bid them an affectionate farewe11.12
Many stories, some of them fictional, have been
written about Lee's occupation of Maryland.

The most

prominent story of the Fredrick occupation was that of
Barbara Frietchie.

'I'his grand old lady was supposed to

have unfurled the Union banner in defiance to Jackson's
troops.

The entire story was written up on a poem

by Whittier which was mere Union propaganda.

However,

Jackson was the subject of several true stories that
date from the occupation of Fredrick.

On September

6th, General Jackson was waylaid by two Baltimore girls
who paralyzed him with smiles, embraces, and questions.
Then, seemingly satisfied, they drove off.

Jackson was so

emba.rrased that he stayed in his tent the rest of the
day.

The following day he attended church services at

the German Reformed Church.

In the midst of the services

Jackson fell soundly asleep and the loyal Union preacher
prayed for President Lincoln.

•stonewall" was finally

awakened by the organ music, and when told of the prayers
12Botkin, pp. 218-19.
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for Lincoln, was quite amused and stated, "I'm sure he
needs it .nl3
Fullfilling McClellan's and Seward's fears, Lee
sent six of his nine infantry divisions against Harper's
Ferry.

The orders called for a three pronged encirclement

of and an attack on Harper's Ferry.

McLaws' division was to

go by way of Pleasant Valley and capture Maryland Heights.
Jackson was to march sixty miles north and west and drive
out the 2500 Federal forces at Martinsburg.

Having

completed this task, he would march southward and take
Bolivar Heights.

J. G. Walker's division was to follow

the Monocacy River to the Potomac and destroy an aqueduct
on the Chespeake and Ohio Canal.

On completion of this

assignment, he was to cross the Potomac, into Virginia
and occupy Loudon Heights across the Shenandoah River
looking down upon Harper's Ferry.14

By splitting the

Confederate forces in enemy country, Lee showed contempt
for the Union army.

He expressed his faith in his plan

when he wrote his thoughts about General McClellan to
J. G • Walker :

He is an:able general but a very
cautious one. His enemies among his own
people think him too much so. His army
is in a very demoralized and chaotic
condition, and will not be prepared for
offensive opera tion--or he wLl.l not
think it so--for three or four weeks.

13 Johnson, II, p. 620.
14Robert D. Hoffsommer, "Jackson's Capture of Harper's
Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. I, No. 5 (August,
1962), pp. 12-13.

Ferry,•

8
Before that lime I hope to be on the
Susquehanna.
'.:>

On September 10th, the plan was set into action as
McLaws moved westws.rd from Fredrick and the following day
crossed South Mountain to Brownsville in Pleasant Valley.
rhe plan called for the army to be at Harper's Ferry on

1

the 12th.

By nightfall of that date McLaws had reached

the Potomac three miles from the objective.

At 10:30 A.M.

the following morning the 17th Mississippi fired on
Federal sharpshooters and by

4:30 P.M. all Federals were

cleared from Maryland Heights and Sandy Hook.

Next

morning a road was cut to the summit and guns were placed
in position two days behind schedule.

16

Jackson had left for Harper's Ferry by crossing
South Mountain at '11urner' s Pass on September 10th.
night

WAS

The

spent encamped at Boobesboro where a minor

engagement took place.

Jackson traveled toward Martins-

burg in a great curve via Williamsport.

The 2500

Federal troops garrisoned at Martinsburg under Brigadier
General Julius White promptly left to reinforce troops at
Harper's Ferry.

After a hard day's march, Jackson was

persuaded by his host to drink a whisky toddy of which
he said:
• • • he believed he liked the taste of
whisky and brandy more than any soldier
in the army; that they were more palatable
to him than the most fragrant coffee, and
1 5Johnson,, II, p.

606.

16t""'reeman,, II, p. 187.
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for that realQn with others, he rarely
tasted them. f
(It was at Martinsburg that Jackson's local feminine fan
club stripped him of the buttons on his uniform in quest
of souvenirs.)
By the 13th, Jackson's divisions were in position
west of Bolivar Heights and by the 14th, the encirclement
was complete (see Map II, P• 34).
The third attack column under Walker attempted to
destroy an aqueduct on the Chespeake and Ohio Canal but
failed.

Receiving Special Orders 191, Walker moved

toward Harper's Ferry via Fillsboro.
Loudon Heights on the 13th.

Ha arrived at

No resistance was given,

and batteries were mounted two days behind schedule.
September 14.th found seventy guns pointing towards
Harper's Ferry.

This was to be an artilleryman's paradise

or like "shooting fish in a barrel."

On the same day

Jackson signalled McLaws and Walker the following
message:
Harper's .Ferry is completely invested.

I shall swnrnon its commander to surrender.

Should he refuse I shall give him twentyfour hours to remove the non-combata~gs
and then carry the place by assault.
With Harper's Ferry near capitulation, ill fortune
struck the Army of N0 rthern Virginia.

'l'he 27th Indiana

had arrived near Fredrick on September 13th, a warm

17 Johnson, II, p. 623.
18 ~., pp.

607-609.
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autumn day.

I'wo Federal soldiers, Private Barton W.

1

Mitchell and Sergeant M. Bloss, in search of a shade
tree noticed a paper on the ground.

Within the paper

were wrapped several fresh cigars which were promptly
divided and then the importance of the document was
noticed.

The paper passed up the echelons of command

until Colonel

s. E.

Pittman recognized the handwriting

and the signature as Assistant Adjutant General R. H.
Chilton's. 1 9

Pittman took the document to McClellan

who was in conference but due to its importance he read
the following order:
Headquarters Army of Northern Va
Sept. 9, 1862
•
Special Orders, No. 191
The army will resume its march tomorrow,
taking the Hagerstown road. Gen. Jackson's
command will form the advance and after passing
Middletown, with such portion as he may select,
will take the route towards Sharpsburg, cross
the Potomac at the most convenient point,
and by Friday night take possession of the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture such
of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and
intercept such as may attempt to escape
from Harper's Ferry.
Gen. Longstreet's command will pursue
the same road as far as Boonsborough, where
it will halt with reserve, supply and baggage
trains of the army.
Gen. McLaws, with his own division and
that of Gen. R. H. Anderson, will follow Gen.
Longstreet; and reaching Middletown he will
take the route to Harper's Ferry and by Friday
morning possess himself of the Maryland
Heights and endeavor to capture the enemy
at Harper's Ferry and vicinity.
19James v. Marfin, "The Lost Orders,• Civil War
'rimes Illustrated, Vol. I, No. 5 (August, 1962}, pp. 28-29.
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Gen. Walker with his division after
accomplishing the object in which he is now
engaged, will cross the Potomac at Cheek's
ford ascend its right bank to Lovettsville,
take possession of Loudon•s Heights, if
practical, by Friday morning; Key's ford
on his left, and the road between the end
of the mountain and the Potomac on his right.
He will, as far as practical. co-operate with
Gen. McLaws and Gen. Jackson in intercepting
the retreat of the enemy.
Gen. D. H. Hill's division will form
the rear guard of the army pursuing the road
taken by the main body. 'l'he reserve artillery
ordanance and supply trains, etc., will precede
Gen. Hill.
Gen. Stuart will detach a squadron of
cavalry to accompany the commands of Gen.
Longstreet, Jackson, and McLaws and with the
main body of the cavalry will cover the route
of the army and bring up all stragglers that
may have been left behind.
The commands of Gens. Jackson, McLaws,
and Walker, after accomplishing the objects
for which they have been detached, will join
the main body of the army at Boonsborough or
Hagerstown.
Each regiment on the march will
habitually carry its axes in the regimental
ordnance-wagon for use of the men at their
encampments, to procure wood, etc.
By command of Gen. R. E. Lee.
R • H. Chi 1 ton
Assist. Adj. Gen.
Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hil~
Commanding Division 0
wra.ving the paper around McClellan said to one
general, "Here is a paper with which if I cannot whip
'Bobbie Lee,' I will be willing to go home."

To Lincoln

McClellan wrote that he had the plans of the enemy and
was confident of success.

York:

He also gave the President the

20 George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story, New
Charles L. Webster Co., 1887, p. 573.
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important military information that he had been received
enthusiastically by the ladies of Maryland.21
'l1he lost Orders No. 191 were issued September 9th,
and on the 13th McClellan held the same orders.

Six copies

of the 111 fated order had been issued to (1) Longstreet,
(2) Jackson, (3) D. H. Hill, (4) McLaws, (5) Walker, and

(6) Lee's official record book.

However, Jackson had made

a copy of Order 191 from his own orders for his brotherin-law, D. H. Hill.

Lee's copy to Hill never arrived and

thus must have been the Lost Order.

Quite apart from

the question of who was responsible for the loss of the
document, it should be pointed out that according to one
report the orders were found on D. H. Hill's old campsite
wrapped around cigars.

For what it is worth, D. H. Hill

did smoke cigars.22
Upon receiving Order 191, General McClellan conceived
the idea to cut the enemy in two and beat him in detail.
He moved with caution because of a Pinkerton report which
numbered Lee's army at 120,000 and Order 191 referred to
Longstreet as the "main body" of the army at Boonesboro.
In reality D. H. Hill and Longstreet's command numbered
15,000 men of which 10,000 were twelve miles beyond
Boonesboro at Hagerstown.23

York:

21T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, New
Alfred A. Knopf, 1952, p. 166.

22James v. Murfin, Civil War Times Illustrated,
Vol. I, No. 5 (August, 1962), pp. 28-29.
23Dwight E. Stinson, "'rhe Battle of South Mountain,"
Civil War Times Illustrated, Vol. I, No. 5, (August, 1962),
pp. 14-15.
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By night fall on the 13th McC1ellan's cavalry, led
by Pleasanton, had reached the base of Squth Mountain.

McClellan ordered the bulk of his 87,000 man

a~my

toward

Middletown to offer fight to Lee's "main body" at Turner's
Gap or Boonesboro.

Franklin's corps was ordered to relieve

Harper's Ferry and destroy McLaws in Pleasant Valley.
General Franklin was to attack Crampton 1 s Gap at daybreak,
the 14th, and use all "intellect and the utmost activity
that a general can exercise." 2 4
General Lee at Hagerstown was quite uneasy owing
to reports from Stuart that enemy infantry was approaching
'l'urner 1 s Gap and reports were lagging from Harper 1 s Ferry.
General Longstreet and General D. H. Hill suggested to Lee
that he concentrate at Sharpsburg rather than 'l'urner' s Pass.
Lee quickly overruled this idea and sent Stuart and Hill
to hold the Gap.

Longstreet's command was ordered to

join Hill the next morning.(l.4th).
At daybreak of the 14th, as Hill rode out to
study the situation, he heard the rumbling of wheels of
the Federals coming up the mountain.

Looking for Stuart,

he soon learned that J. E. B. had gone to Crampton•s Gap
to aid McLaws.

Hill hurriedly deployed his troops,

putting Garland's brigade on his right to hold Fox's
Gap (known as the old Sharpsburg Road).

Colquit's

brigade was to hold the ground dominating Turner's Gap

(see Map III, p. 34).

Contact with the Federal army

was established at 9:00 A.M. with Cox's division charging
vigorously on Fox's Gap.

Under a fierce fire General

Garland fell with a mortal wound and his brigade broke
and was driven from the field.

Cox's attack was stopped

at Mountain House by G. B. Anderson's
retired to the crest of Fox's Gap.
stopped;

b~igade

and Cox

Thus, all action

the first phase of the battle of South Mountain

was over. 2 5
McClellan was not surprised that Cox had been
repulsed because he felt that he was fighting the "main
body" of Lee's army.

As the reader will recall, this

misconception was gained from "Lost Order

191." D. H. Hill

said later that this order was worth 10,000 men to him
because it gave him time to strengthen his position.
McClellan was also strengthening his position by sending
Hooker's corps to the right and Reno's corps to the left.
The Confederates were further strengthened when Longstreet's
division arrived at 3:30 P. M., although confusion reigned
supreme for a time while his troops were deployed.26
The second phase of the Battle of South Mountain
began at 5:00 P.M. with the advance of Reno and Hooker.
The Confederates fought gallantly, but slowly they were
losing ground.

Rhodes, on the Confederate extreme left,

25Freeman, II, p.

i74.

26 McClellan, p. 576 •
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lost a strategic hill to Seymour, and Drayton•s brigade
was driven back only to be saved by JoJ:m B. Hood.

Colquitt

had turned back a charge by Gibbon's

b~igade

on the

National Road (see Map III, p. 34).

The fighting lasted

until ten o'clock that evening with the casualties numbering
2300 for the Confederates.

Federal losses were put at 1831

plus the loss of Federal General Jesse Reno who was killed
while inspecting his skirmish lines.27
September 14th found Lee withdrawing to Sharpsburg
and ready to retreat from Maryland.

The general posted

his forces on the Sharpsburg Heights, his line running
north and south and lying to the east of Hagerstown-Harper 1 s Ferry Pike (see Map V, p. 36). 28

He then sent

the following message to McLaws at Harper's Ferry:
General: The day has gone against us and
this army will go by Sharpsburg and across
the river it is necessary for you to abandon
your position (on Maryland Hts.} • • •
ascertain the best crossing of the Potomac,
and if you can find any between you and
Shepherdstown, leave t~A Shepherdstown
Ford for this command. /
Lee's fighting spirit was restored when he received
a message from Jackson stating:

Harper's Ferry will

probably fall tomorrow (15th) and his men would rejoin
2 7Freeman, II, p. 183.
2 Bwarren H. Hassler, General George B. McClellan,
Baton Rouge: Louisianna State University Press, p. 266.
29Freeman, II, p. 192.
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him later.30
General McClellan, jubilant following the Battle
of South Mountain, wired General Halleck the following
message:
After a very severe engagement the
corps of Hooker and Reno have carried the
heights commanding the Hagerstown road.
The troops behaved magnificently. They
never fought better. • • 'I'he action
continued until after dark and terminated
leaving us in possession of the entire 31
crest. It has been a glorious victory.
While the Battle of South Mountain was being fought,
Franklin's corps moving on Harper's Ferry was engaged with
McLaws at Crampton's Gap (five miles south of Turner's Gap).
Franklin deployed his troops after three hours of meticulous
preparation, placing Slosum's division on the right and
Smith's division on the left (see Map IV, p. 35).

The

Federal advance was made over open ground and under
Confederate artillery fire.

r11he

advance sent the Confeder-

ates scurrying from the hill and Franklin had won a
smashing victory.

However, darkness prevented Franklin

from following up this victory until the next day.

On

the 15th, Franklin learned that McLaws had stretched his
defense across Pleasant Valley and an attack would be
fatal.3 2
.As

the Battle of Crampton' s Gap was in full progress

3o!lli. , p.

i

92 •

31 H. J. Eckenrode, George B. McClellan, New York:
Van Rees Press, p.

186.

32Johnson, II, PP•

591-97•
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Walker (at Harper's Ferry) heard the gunfire and signalled
Jackson that McC1ellan must be advancing in force.

Jackson's

reply was that it was probably a cavalry engagement between
Stuart and Pleasanton.

Walker was not satisfied with that

answer and feared if the Federals were given twenty-four
hours to surrender at Harper's Ferry, Lee might be in
grave danger.

Walker then asked Jackson's permission to

fire on the fort, but Jackson gave no reply.

Seizing

the opportunity, Walker placed troops in full Federal
view and the "Yanks" opened their fire.

This was exactly

what General Walker had wanted and all the Confederate
guns opened fire.

The firing continued until five o'clock

that evening and only one or two of the Federal guns were
left.33
On the night of September 14th, the only bright
spot of the entire Harper's Ferry affair took place as
Colonel B. F. (Grimes) Davis and 1300 Union cavalry escaped
Harper's Ferry.

They crossed the pontoon bridge north to

Sharpsburg and passed through that city at daybreak of
the 15th.

While crossing the Hagerstown and Williamsport

road, Longstreet's ammunition train was captured.

The

train consisted of 97 wagons and 600 men.34
September 15th dawned foggy at Harper•s'Ferry and
the bombardment continued until 8:00 A. M., at which time
33rb1d., PP• 609-610.

34~., p. 611.
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the fortress surrendered.

General A. P. Hill was put in

charge of the surrender which netted 12,520 prisoners,
13,000 arms, 73 pieces of artillery, and several hundred
wagons.

Many of the Union soldiers were curious to see

Jackson as he rode in, many saluted him and he returned
their salutes.

One Union soldier said, "Boys, he's not

much for looks, but if we'd had him we wouldn't been
caught in this trap\•35
Jackson's troops then prepared two days rations
and started for Sharpsburg.
admission was "severe."

The march by Jackson's own

As the regiments, on the morning

of the 16th, one after another reached Sharpsburg, the
men dropped to the ground and Jackson rode on to report
to Lee.

Lee was glad to see Jackson for it seemed that

the Federals in vast numbers were preparing for a battle
and Jackson could help reinforce the thin Confederate
line drawn up behind Antietam Creek.

Jackson and Lee

surveyed the situation and decided McClellan must know
their situation owing to the boldness of this usually
cautious man.

General Longstreet advised Lee against

fighting here but was overruled and Jackson relied on
Lee's judgement.36
McClellan was organizing his forces for the on35Freeman, II, p. 199.

36~., p. 201.
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coming battle by reconnoitering, clearing approaches,
and massing his cannon on the east side of Antietam creek.
The artillery position favored the Federals and they were
able to do here what McClellan had done at Malvern Hill.
The Union guns could sweep the Confederate positions with
a )aail of iron.

As a result, Sharpsburg was known as

"Artillery Hell" for the southern cannoneers.
McClellan's activities are shown by a wire telegraphed to Halleck on the 16th:
The enemy yesterday held a position just
in front of Sharpsburg. When our troops
arrived in sufficient fore~ it was too
late in the day to attack.'7
·
Had McClellan attacked Lee, the Confederate leader
would have had fourteen brigades (18 1 000 men) of infantry
compared to McClellan's six corps

(75 1 000 men).38

This morning (16th) a heavy fog has thus
far pre~ented us doing more than to ascertain that some of the enemy are still there.
Do not know in what force. Will attack as
soon as situation of enemy is developed • • •
'I'he time lost on account of the fog is
being occupied in getting up supplies,
for the want o~ 9 which many of our men
are suffering.
From the Pry house where McClellan had established
his headquarters came the Union battle plans.

My plans for the impending general engagement
37Freeman, II, p. 202.
38Fredrick Tilberg 1 Antietam, United States Department
of Interior Handbook Series No. 31, (Washington: u.s.
Goverrunent Printing Office, 1961), pp. 15-16.
39Eckenrode 1 p. 189.
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was to attack the enemy's left with the corps
of Hooker and Mansfield, supported by Sumner's
and if necessary by Franklin's, and as soon
as matters looked favorable there to move
the corps of Burnside against the enemy's
extreme right, upon the ridge running to
the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having
carried their position, to press along the
crest toward our right, and whenever either
of these flank movements should be successful,
to advance our c~3ter with all the forces
then disposable.4
The first movement of Federal troops came at 2 P.M.
on the 16th, as Hooker marched his troops across the Antietam
Creek at the Keedysville Road bridge (upper bridge).
Hooker moved in a northwesterly direction until he reached
the Hagerstown Pike where he turned southward towards
Sharpsburg (see Map V, p.

36).

Union soldiers marched

down the pike unmolested until about sunset when they ran
into Hood's division of Confederates pickets.

A short

skirmish ensued and Lee was alerted as to the direction
from which the main attack would probably come.

At

midnight more F'ederal troops crossed the creek under
the command of General Mansfield.

This XII Corps consisted

of two divisions under Williams and Greene.

They

bivouacked one mile behind Hooker's corps on the J.
Poffenberger farm at 2 A. M. on the 17th.4l
It will be helpful in understanding the battle
of Antietam to view the engagement in three phases.
4oJohnson, II, p.

633.

41McClell~n, pp. 590-91.

The
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battle was actually fought in a piecemeal fashion rather
than as an all out attack.

It should also be pointed out

that the numerical strength of the two opposing armies
on the eve of the battle differed greatly.
stated that he had

McClellan

87,164 men available for duty, this

was a careless and misleading figure.

The actual combat

effectives numbered 70,000 to 75,000.

On the Confederate

side, Lee contended that his troops numbered less than
40,000 which seems to be a considerate underestimate.
Livermore trunks that 51,844 southern effectives were
engaged against McClellan at Antietam, but adds the figure
might well be 58,844. 42
'I'he 17th dawned gray and drizzly, but soon turned
into a perfect Indian Summer day.

The first phase of the

battle began as Hooker's 1st Corps moved southward at 5:30 A.M.,
on the Hagerstown Pike.

Meade's division was in the center

with Ricketts and Doubleday forming the flanks.

Hooker's

objective was to take the high ground around the white
Dunker Church where the
meet.

Smoketo~m

and· Hagerstown roads

'l'o take this church, Hooker had to pass through a

thirty acre cornfield belonging to D. R. Miller and through
woods parallel to the cornfield known as East and West
Woods.

Confederate artillery fire from the East started

as soon as it was light.

Hooker's answer was to open a

frontal artillery fire of grape and canister on the

42 Hassler,

p. 271.
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grayclad infantry concealed amid the high stalks of the
cornfield.

The Federals then charged toward Miller's barn

and cornfield.

After running through the cornfield the

Union soldiers leaped the fence at the south end of the
field only to be cut down by the hundreds.

The Northern

lines fell and the "Yanks" ran back into the cornfield
seeking shelter.

On

the Union right, Confederates swarmed

out of the West Woods to charge Gibbon's exposed guns.
Gibbon's

gunner~

double charged their cannon with cannister

and forced the Confederates to flee for shelter.

On the

left, Rickett's division held the edge of East Woods.

The

fierceness of this battle is shown in Hooker's report of
the cornfield fighting.
Every stalk of corn in the northern and
greater part of the field was cut as closely
as could have been with a knife, and the
slain lay in rows precisely as they had
stood in thei43ranks a few moments
before, • • •
The first clash had sent Lawton's staff running
to the rear in search of Hood for reinforcements.

All

Confederate brigades from Early's right had been swept
away (see Map V, p.36 }, and Hood deployed his troops
in the southern edge of the cornfield.

Hood expresses

his fear:
As his veterans doggedly loaded and fired,
they had to pass over dead men who lay
in rows where the Federal fire had swept
them in the first blast of the battle.
43orricial Records of the War of Rebellion, Vol. XIX,
Part One, Washington: u.s. Government Printing Office, 1880.
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"Never before," said Hood, "was I so
continuously troubled with fear that my
horse would further injure some wounded
fellow sp~dier, lying helpless on the
ground."44
General Mansfield's XII Corps entered the field at
7:00 A.M. "to support and relieve Hooker" but before the
general could deploy his troops he fell mortally wounded
in the East Woods (see Map VI, p. 37).

General Williams

took over command and tried to gather information from
Hooker who had been.wounded.

Hooker commented about

his wound:
My command followed the fugitives closely
until we had passed the cornfield a quarter
of a mile or more, when I was removed from
my saddle in the act of falling out of it
from loss of blood, having pr.~viously been
struck without my knowledge. LI·?
Hooker was replaced by Meade who promptly withdrew
to regroup;

the corps had suffered seriously (2470 killed

and wounded) but it was not utterly dispersed as Sumner
had falsely told in his reports.
Williams' attack advanced toward the East and West
Woods diverging as they moved forth.

Greene's division

met light resistance as they cleared the East Woods and
flanked Hood out of the Miller cornfield.

For a time

Greene gained a foothold in the West Woods near Dunker
Church which he held until 1:30 P.M.
44Freeman, II, p. 208.
45Johnson, II, p. 640.

On the right or

West Woods, Williams met heavy resistance and the Confederates held their line.

During this sharp engagement, the

Twelfth Corps lost approximately l, 700
engaged.

men out of about 7,000

It was noWt 9:00 A.M., and the second of successive

Federal corps attacks had ground to a halt.4- 6
Following the Mansfield (Williams) attack, Hood's
di.vision fell back to Dunker Church for rest and ammunition.
Hood describes the fierceness of the battle in this
plea:
For God's sakes, more troops cried Hood.
When a brother-officer rode over and
asked, "Where is your Division?" Hood4
answered grimly, &Dead on the Field." 7
The battle line had changed directions from north

to east as a result of the first Union advance.

At 9:30

A.M. General Sumner's II Corps of 10,000 men went into

action east of Dunker Church.

Sumner deployed his .men

into three battle lines sixty to seventy yards apart
without a single regiment as flankers on the right or
left (see Map VII, p. 38).

'fhe corps moved forward with

French's division on the far left, Greene of William 1 s
corps holding near the church, and Sedgwick's division
to the right.

Sedgwick failed to connect his line with

Greene and thus his division charged into the West Woods
by itself.

The effects of that charge were disastrous.

46Edward J. Stackpole, "'Showdown at Sharpsburg,"
Civil War 1J.limes Illustrated, Vol. I, No. 5 (August, 1962),

p.

4;.

47Freeman, II, p. 209.
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Jackson had just placed McLaws and Walker in the West Woods
and they hit Sedgwick from three sides.

'l'wenty-two hundred

of his five thousand men died or were wounded in fifteen
minutes.

Sedgwick received his third wound of the day as

the troops fell back in disordered retreat.

Union artillery

stopped McLaws 1 counterattack but not before the entire
Federal line had been pushed back to a line west of the
conflict. 48
For all practical purposes the battle on the extreme
right was over by ten o 1 clock.

'.11he results of fl ve hours

of fierce fighting on Jackson's front netted 6,000 Confederates killed or wounded, while the Federals lost 7,000 killed
or wounded.

One-third of McClellan's army (six divisions)

had failed to break the Confederate line.49

The signifi-

cance of the battle was shown by McClellan's telegraph to
Halleck.
We are in the midst of the most terrible
battle of the war--perhaps of history. 'I1hus
far it looks well, but I have great odds
against me. Hurry up all the troops possible.
Our loss has been terrific, but we have gained
much ground. I have thrown the mass of the
army on the left flank, Burnside is now
attacking the right, and I hold my small
reserve, consisting of Porter's Fifth Corps,
ready to attack the center as soon as the
flank movements are developed. I hoge that
God will give us a glorious victory.JO
48Johnson, II, pp.

6lt3-44.

49Edward J. Stackpole, Civil War Times Illustrated,
Vol. I, No. 5, P• 198.
50Eckenrode, p.

198.
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The second phase of the battle of Antietam centered
around Sunken Road and the Roulette-Clipp farm buildings.
French's division on Greene's left and Richardson's
division combined assault drove the Confederates from the
farm buildings and the Sunken Road.

The Confederates

fought fearlessly in defending the Sunken Road.

The road

was piled full of Confederate dead and ca.me to be known as
"Bloody Lane."

The fighting was furious--no quarter was

asked and none given.

The battle raged from 10:00 A.M.

to l:OO P.M. but the Confederates (after losing considerable
ground) held their line.

The Union army paid a high price

for the victory at "Bloody Lane" with the loss of Division
Commander Richardson and approximately 3,000 men.

General

Longstreet summed up the entire battle in referral to his
troops:
They were 'badly whipped" in Longstreet's words,
but they wouldn't admit. the fact, and since
McClellan didn't seem to know when or where
he was ahead of the game, it became ~Iident
that Lee was as yet far from licked.?
At 2:00 P.M. Franklin's VI Corps of 10,000 men crossed
the creek and Franklin suggested another attack on Lee's
left.

Sumner {probably influenced by Sedgwick's defeat)

decided against this move as shown by McClellan's writings:
Gen. Sumner expressed the most decided opinion
against another attempt during that day to
assault the enemy's position in front, as
portions of our troops were so much scattered
51Edward J. Stackpole, Civil War Times Illustrated,
Vol. I, No. 5, P• 46.
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and demoralized. In view of these circumstances,
after making changes of some of the troops,
I directed the diffe5~nt commanders to hold
their positions • • •
Franklin's reserve corps was not committed and remained
in support of the Federal right.

In the center of the

Union lines Fitz-John Porter's V Corps was also held in
reserve as was Pleasanton' s cavalry.

1.'he Union commander

turned to defensive measures after realizing this was tha
only force that stood between the enemy and the Federal
supply train on the Boonesboro Pike.53
'l'he final phase of the battle shifts to the Confederate
right where D. R. Jones with 2000 men was defending a mile
of front against Burnside's four divisions (13,000 men).
McClellan sent a message to Burnside at 8:00 A.M. to take
the bridge which bears his name.

Two couriers and five hours

later the bridge was finally taken.

Burnside dallied all

morning and failed to look for fords on the creek.

It

apparently never occurred to Burnside or Cox to test the
depth of the water in the creek.

Had they done so, they

would have found that it could have been easily waded at
almost any place.54
Burnside's first attempt to cross the bridge was
given to Colonel George Crook and his three regiments of
Ohioans.

They formed their battle-lines in a valley

52McC1ellan, p. 601.
53Tilberg, p.

39.

54Edward J. Stackpole, Civil War Times Illustrated,
Vol. I, No. 5, P• 47.
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one-eighth mile from the bridge, charged over the hills
boldly, lost their way, and missed the bridge completelyL
The Federals came out on a. low plateau in the bend of the
creek with several rebel guns trained on them.

Crook

got his Ohioans to the bank and fired at the Confederates
but Burnside's first assault was hardly more than a fizzla.55
General Burnside's next assault was given to the
5lst Pennsylvania and 5lst New York.
Colonel Edward Ferrero said, "as a personal
request General Burnside wants you to take the
bridge, will you do it?"
Some Corporal in the Pennsylvania
regiment sang out, "Will you give us our
whisky Colonel, if we make it?• .
Ferrero blinked and laughed, •yes,
by God," he shouted1
Some days later, at a ceremony with
Ferrero getting a brigadier's commission for
valor, some Pennsylvanian called out, "How
about that whisky?"
Ferrero heard.it, grinned and turned his
head long enough to say: "You'll get it"-and next morning a keg of the stuff was sent
over from the brigade headquarters and the
long dry spell was over.56
Needless to say the 5lst did cross the bridge at
1:00 P.M. before the Confederate artillery could be
trained on them.

By 3:00 P.M. the entire II Corps had

crossed Antietam Creek and was attacking Jones' brigade
on the crest east of Sharpsburg (see Map VIII, p. 39).
The attackers moved slowly and cautiously toward Sharpsburg
carrying the Confederate brigades of Kemper, Drayton, and
55Bruce Catton, Mr. Lincoln's Armz~ Garden City,
New York: Doubleday & Company, pp. 3o7-o~.

-

56rbid., pp. 310-311.
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Garnett.

Jenkin's brigade which was on higher ground held

on but by 4:00 P.M. the battle on the Confederate right was
nearly lost.

Another 1200 yards farther west and the

Federals would have cut the Confederates left line of
retreat {Sharpsburg-Shepherdstown Road).57
Disaster was in the making and at the Confederacy's
darkest hour A. P. Hill in his red battle shirt appeared
with 3,000 men from Harper's Ferry.

When Hill met Lee,

tradition has it that Lee embraced him in relief .58

After

a brief rest Hill's men were deployed on the extreme right
and they marched into battle.
in the cornfield.

Hill met Harland's brigade

rhe new Union brigade allowed Hill• s

1

men, who were wearing the blue uniforms that they had
captured at Harper's Ferry, to approach too close before
being challenged.

Suddenly, there was a crash of musketry

at short range from the advancing "bluecoats" and the
Federals broke in confusion.59

In an attempt to bring the

Union left into position, Rodman fell mortally wounded.
Orders were sent to Willcox and Crook to retire their
troops and the entire Union line retreated in good order
to the west bank of the Antietam.

A. P. Hill fought with

such vigor that Burnside's men probably felt that he was
still carrying a grudge.
Before the war A. P. Hill and McClellan
had been rivals for the hand of' the

57Freeman, II, PP• 220-21.
58Ibid., P• 222.
59Hassler, p.

289.
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beautiful Ellen Marcy daughter of an
army officer. She chose McClellan at
last, and (as the soldiers believed)
Hill carried a great anger against the
successful suitor, which accounted for
the violence of his attacks, • • •
when a rattle of firing aroused the
army and told it that Lee's men were
attacki~, one veteran growled disgustedly:
God 1 s sake, Nellie why didn't
you marry him?"60
As night fell the battle of Antietam came to a
close.

The Union soldiers entrenched near the Creek fell

to their knees and slept on their rifles.

The bloodiest

day in American history had come to a close with the
Union army losing approximately 12,400 men and the

.

Confederates 13,700 men.

61 This infamous carnage was

described by Lieutenant Colonel William H. Powell, the
Fifth Corps historian, as he passed over the battlefield.
The historian of this work rode over
it • • • particularly that part where Generals
Hooker and Sumner fought. He passed where
now blighted stalks only indicated the field
of waving corn when the battle commenced,
and saw the dead lying all through its
aisles; then cut into the barren field.beyond
where bodies attired mainly in Confederate
uniforms were lying in ranks so regular
that they must have been mowed down in
swaths. Burying parties were already
busily engaged, and had put away to rest
many Union men~ Still here, as everywhere,
they were scattered over the fields. The
ground was strewn with muskets, knapsaks,
cartridge boxes, and articles of clothing,
with the carcasses of horses, and with
thousands of shot and shell. Glancing at
each corpse, he passed on the road by the
Dunkard Church. Could it be that those
were the faces of his late antagonist?
60catton, Mr. Lincoln's Army, p. 318.
6l!bid.,
............... P• 293 •
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They were so absolutely black that they
looked as if they might be negroes. Their
eyes in many instances were protruding
from their sockets: their heads, hands
and limbs were swollen to twice their
natural slze. rrheir :ms.~rea and bloated
remains, emptied of all that made them
manlike-human were simply repulsive.
A.nd thus it was, with an almost
sickening sensation he rode over this
graveyard of unburied dead. No matter
in what direction he turned, it was all
the same shocking picture, awakening
awe rather than pity, benumbing the
senses rather than touching the heart,
glazing the eye with horror rather
than filling. tt with tears. And t~2
was the war ~n all its hideousness.
The following day McClellan wired Halleck about the
battle.
The battle of.yesterday continued for
fourteen hours and until after dark.
We held all we had gained except a
portion of the extreme left; that was
obliged to abandon a part of what it
had gained. Our .losses were heavy,
especially in general officers. The
battle will probably be renewed today.
Send all.the troops that yo~ can by
the most expeditious route.b3
Neither army renewed the battle on the 18th but
rather spent the day removing the wounded, burying the
dead, and giving rest to the fatigued.

'I1he

night of the

18th, Lee moved his army across the Potomac at Shepherdstown and back into Virginia.

'11he retreat went unmolested

by the Union army.
McClellan has· been severely criticized for his:
inaction of Thursday, the 18th of September.

62rbid., p. 290
63Eckenrode, p. 205.
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feels that there were several reasons for the Federal
commander's inaction.

First, McClellan knew the desperate

condition of his men, but he did not know that Lee's
brigades had suffered even worse.

Secondly, most of

McClellan•s subordinates discouraged the resumption of the
attack because of the belief of Lee's superiority in
numbers.

This belief was based on a mistaken report

from the secret service and the error was accepted by
officers and men.64

Finally, there was no cause for the

Union army to risk a serious reverse.

Lee's Maryland

campaign was ruined and there was nothing left for him
to do but recross the Potomac.

A renewal of the battle

would have given the Confederates a chance to snatch
victory out of failure.65
The results of the battle of Antietam compelled
Lee to alter his strategy and abandon his first invasion
of enemy territory.

President Lincoln seized this oppor-

tunity to issue his Emancipation Proclamation.

Lee's

repulse in Maryland possl bly kept the British government
from recognizing Southern independance.

Overall, the

battle of Antietam was a strategic defeat for the South,
a moral victory for the North, and a source of renewed
determination on both sides to fight on to ultimate
victory.
64Freeman, p. 658.
65Eckenrode, p. 206.

Map I
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General Strategy of Maryland Campaign

P.. .-.eellville.

0

GENERAL OR STRATEGIC MAP-Lee's route (indicated by 11 line
of heavy dots) is shown from the Manassas battlefield to Frederick, 11t
which point his comm .. nd divides for the Harpers Ferry operation. The
routes of Long<lr""' 1... I fagerstown, and Jachon, Mclaws, alld Wal•er

to Harpers Ferry are shown also. McClellan's advance in three columns
to Frederick is indicated by heavy broken lines. This advance is then
co11tinued as far as South Mountain. The Federal routes from that point
ere omitted, for clarity, but may be derived from the text.·

Map II

Harpers Ferry

CAPTURE OF HARPERS FERRY-The positions of Jackson's divisions
-Hill, Lawton, and Jones-on the night of September 13, and their
routes from there to their attack positions are shown here. The initial
positions of Walker's and Mclaws' divisions on Loudoun Heights and
Elk Ridge are also shown, together with Walker's route on to Harpers
Ferry, and Mclaws' route to Maryland Heights, which he captured on
the 14th. The Federal lines at the north end of Bolivar Heights are
shown as solid lines. The artillery symbols, shown for the Confederates
only, represent batteries and battalions, not single guns.
•.

Map III ,
I

Turners Gap

CONTOUR INTERVAL JOO FEET

BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN-For the Federals the initial and
final positions are shown; for the Confederates, only their first positions.
The Federal units were committed successively, not simultaneously,
but this could not have been portrayed except by using several maps.
General Reno fell in Wise's field, which is the small clearing just to
the left of the symbol marked "Hood."
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Map IV
Cramptons Gap

BATTLE OF CRAMPTON'S GAP-This portrays the situation at
3 p. m. on Sunday, Sept. 14, 1862, when Franklin launched his
attack; and the positions reached by his troops two hours later. The
Federal units are indicated by solid rectangles, the Confederates by
open symbols.

Map V
Hookers Advance

1

MILES
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Map VI
Mansfields Attack

SLAUGHTER in the CORNFIELD-The situation about 7 a. m.,
when Hooker's attack had reached ih height, is indicated here. The
fighting is swirling around the West Woods and in D. R. Miller's
cornfield. Mansfield's XII Corps is coming in to join Hooker, About this
time Mansfield ·is fatally wounded, being succeeded by Brig. Gen. A.
S. Williams. Hooker is also wounded, and is succeeded by Meade.

Map VII
Sumners Attack

FEDERAL ARMY IS COMMITTED PIECEMEAL-The situation is
shown from about 9 to 9:45 a. m. Sumner's corps has been thrown in,
and with Mansfield's (Williams') is pressing the attack toward West
Woods and also the sunken road (Bloody Lane). Lee's divisions are in

a critical condition, with heavy losses, and being assailed by successive
heavy blows. But Mclaws is deploying, having just arrived from Harpers
Ferry, and Anderson has nearly reached the battle line. This is the
moment when Burnside should have attacked on the south.
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Map VIII
Burnsides Attack

.. ,
I

MILES
A. P. HILL TO THE RESCUE-Burnside has finally forced a crossing
at the stone bridge which now bears his name, and his divisions are
slowly advancing toward Sharpsburg. At this juncture, so critical for

Lee, A. P. Hill's division arrives from Harpers Ferry, and shortly is
launch~d in a counterattack against Burnside's flank. This stops Burn·
side, and soon McClellan gives up any further effort to attack.

'
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